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ABSTRACT
The emergence of Grid computing technology is being followed by three
main security concerns: the independence of the domains where the resource
providers (RPs) are situated; the need for supporting different security policies and
the non-necessity of the science gateways for user authentication. Great effort has
been involved in order to solve these concerns through the appearance of different
access control models, like Identity-Based Authorization Control (IBAC) and Role-
Based Authorization Control (RBAC), which based their access request decisions
on user identity, that is, on user authentication. However, these models proved as
inflexible, non-scalable and unmanageable in a distributed environment.
Accordingly, a novel approach, known as Atrribute-Based Multipolicy
Authorization Control (ABMAC) model has appeared. ABMAC, which is being
described in this paper, uses the attributes of the Grid entities for user authorization,
based on the concepts of service-oriented architecture (SOA) and the eXtensible
Markup Language (XML) standards – eXtensible Access Control Markup Language
(XACML) and Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML). Moreover, ABMAC
has been partly implemented in the Globus Toolkit 4 (GT4) Authorization
Framework, and consequently it is expected to be outstanding contributor to Grid
security.
INTRODUCTION
Distributed computing has recently emerged into a new promising technology
known as Grid computing, which involves Grid systems as Virtual organizations,
composed of several independent autonomous domains in a service-oriented
architecture. This means that the Grid architecture is based on Web services and
their correlated technologies; hence, by having this kind or architecture, it is self-
explanatory that the Grid should engage network security in its highest degree.
Typical network security infrastructure involves three main network security
principles, widely familiar as the CIA triad - confidentiality, integrity and
availability [1]. These principles are being preserved through three steps: (1)
identification, which describes a method of ensuring that a subject (user, program,
or process) is the entity it claims to be; (2) authentication, which is a process of
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confirming a claimed identity, that is, the mechanism whereby systems may
securely identify their entities and (3) authorization, which is the mechanism of
determining what level of access a particular authenticated entity should have to
safe resources systematized by the system. Accordingly, these steps should be
executed in a consecutive manner in order to provide the necessary level of network
security.
However, the earlier access control models, namely IBAC and RBAC, were
granting access to the users according to their identities, i.e., they have not even
reached the authorization part of the assertion procedure. Therefore, it is more than
obvious that the Grid security remained as challenging issue, which during the past
two decades has motivated the researches to seek for appropriate security solutions.
Hence, various new aspects are being brought along with the developing of the
Grid: (a) its merging with the web services toward service-oriented architecture and
(b) the definition of SAML and XACML as extraordinary contributors to Grid
security. These have led to the appearance of the ABMAC model, which is the
central point of discussion in this research paper [2].
The paper has been organized into several parts. The first section describes
the Grid architecture and its security challenges, with its subsections covering Web
services, XML, XACML and SAML. The second section briefly describes the
disadvantages of the former access-control models and the reason why ABMAC is
supposed to be the outstanding contributor to Grid security. Finally, the last section
dives more deeply into review of the already proposed authorization models by
various researchers and the likelihood of their eventual integration.
OUTLINE OF THE GRID ARCHITECTURE AND ITS SECURITY
CHALLENGES
The Grid is an open distributed, heterogeneous and loosely coupled network,
being composed of Grid systems in form of Virtual Organizations (VOs). The
VOs are based on SOA, where the users access the Grid through science gateways -
web services that serve as portals between VO users and grid resources, without
obliging mandatory authentication to the grid site. The VOs are consisted of several
independent autonomous domains, where the RPs and the users do not reside in the
same security domain and each VO has its own security policy. Hence, the
resource-user relationship imposes three correlated security concerns:
 The independence of the domains where the RPs are situated;
 The need for supporting different security policies;
 The non-necessity of the science gateways for user authentication.
These issues are still being the focal point in many researches, thus the
following subsections shortly introduce the basic Grid computing terms which
depict their contribution in elimination of the major Grid security concerns.
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Brief overview of Web Services and XML
According to the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), a Web Service (WS)
is defined as a software system designed to support interoperable machine-to-
machine interaction over a network. Hence, the Grid’s SOA is based on WSs
standards as its underlying technology - Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP)
for invocation, Web Services Description Language (WSDL) for interface
definition, and Universal Description, Discovery and Integration (UDDI)
registries for service discovery. All of these standards use XML as the
communication format and consequently they enable platform- and machine-
independent communication via the network.
However, the widespread usage of WSs is still in delay because of the
unmanageability in reaching consensus on how to secure the services. This occurs
due to the distinct security standards available for each of the security aspects -
encryption, message integrity, authentication, authorization, etc. Accordingly, two
of the available standards stand out as possible significant contributors in solving
these discrepancies - SAML and XACML, which are described in the next
subsection.
Brief overview of XACML and SAML
XACML is an XML based WS standard for communicating access control
policies between services, which provides: (1) standard XML schema for expressing
policies, rules based on those policies and conditions, and (2) a request/response
protocol for sending a request and having it approved, where the subjects and the
resources are identified using URIs. Accordingly, the XACML authorization
model contains:
 PAP (Policy Administration Point), which provides security policies or
policy sets;
 PIP (Policy Information Point), which provides information regarding
attributes of the subjects, the resource, and the environment obtained by
querying the PIP;
 PEP (Policy Enforcement Point) that intercepts the access requests from
users and sends the requests to the PDP;
 PDP (Policy Decision Point) that makes access decisions according to the
PIP and PAP which are then sent back to the PEP; the PEP then fulfills the
obligations (permits or denies the access request) according to the decision of
PDP (Figure 1).
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Figure 1: XACML authorization model
XACML also defines a policy language, where policies are organized
hierarchically into PolicySets, Policies and Rules, combined using combining
algorithms; a rule is composed of a target, an effect and a condition, while a Policy
consists of a target, one or more rules, and an optional set of obligations [3].
SAML provides security assertion within a trust domain, based on
authentication, attribute and authorization decision information in XML and several
request/response protocols. SAML’s Single Sign-On (SSO) mechanism allows a
user to be able to sign on only once at one access point among a group of trusted
sites. Accordingly, SAML involves two basic parties in its line of work: (1)
Asserting or Authority Party (AP) also familiar as the Identity Provider (IdP),
that is, the source site, which does the assertion job to claim a user and (2) Relying
Party or the destination site, which makes access control decision based on the
information supplied to it by the Asserting Party. SAML also provides two profiles
for transferring assertions from an Asserting Party to Relying Party and for
achieving SSO, known as push and pull mode. The push mode requires the user to
contact an attribute authority service to obtain attribute certificates and “push” them
to the target service when submitting a request (Figure 2, left). This approach allows
the user to select the specific roles he wants to be authorized with. The pull mode,
on the other hand, does not require the users to present any attribute. The attributes
are directly retrieved by the resource provider on behalf of the user (Figure 2, right).
The pull mode makes attribute retrieval transparent to users [4].
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Figure 2: Push and Pull mode
FORMER ACCESS CONTROL MODELS AND THEIR DRAWBACKS
As it was mentioned earlier, the main reason for the delay of widespread
usage of WSs and implementation of SOA is the unmanageability in reaching
consensus on how to secure the services. During the researchers’ efforts to explore
the best solution about this concern, various access control models have appeared,
like it was the case with IBAC and RBAC.
IBAC was initially developed with the intent of preventing user interference
between the machines while committing their resource-sharing tasks. This was done
by assigning permission to the users according to their identities. The IBAC
approach was accomplished through the usage of Access Control Lists (ACLs)
consisted of user’s Distinguished Name (DN) mapped to a local grid site account.
The account is set up to authorize access only to users whose DN appear on the
ACL, according to their account privileges. The DNs are Lightweight Directory
Access Protocol’s (LDAP) referents to the directory server’s collection of entries
(objects). These are organized in hierarchical manner and have distinct attributes
like name, address and type, which are expressed in ‘attribute=value’ pairs .
However, during many undertaken thorough analyses over time, IBAC
showed a diversity of inevitable issues, like non-manageable trust relationships,
role explosions, information leakage, problems with delegation and revocation,
misalignment of incentives, inflexibility for scalability, ambient authorities and
difficulties with its distributed identity management [5]. As a result, the
administration of IBAC was becoming more untenable and error-prone with the
constant increase of the number of user. This headed toward the emergence of new
concepts - role, owner and group, which gave birth to the RBAC model.
The basic idea of the RBAC model was the assignment of users to roles,
permissions to roles and users acquirement for permissions for being members of
roles. A user was assigned to many roles and vice versa. The permission-role
assignment was in similar concept. The RBAC model was organized in four levels:
(1) Flat (core) RBAC level; (2) Hierarchical - added requirements for supporting
role hierarchies; (3) Constrained - added constraints on the hierarchical level and
(4) Symmetric (consolidated) - added a requirement for permission-role review.
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The two main concepts associated with RBAC were: (a) Role Enablement
Authority (REA), which was responsible for assignment of subjects to roles and
(b) Role Assignment Policies (RAP), which was responsible for handling of role
assignment requests for each candidate role. These concepts used different
PolicySets defined by XACML in order to implement the role hierarchy.
However, as it was the case with IBAC, RBAC also revealed as flaw-full
concept. Namely, it showed non-correspondence to the constrained level of
RBAC and involved only partial delegation of the roles [6, 7]. RBAC’s flaws
have led toward developing a new and highly improved access control model,
familiar as the ABMAC model, which is discussed in the next section.
ATTRIBUTE-BASED MULTIPOLICY ACCESS CONTROL MODEL
Attribute-Based Multipolicy Access Control (ABMAC) model enables
authorization decisions based on the attributes of the resource/service requesters and
thus eliminating the flaws in the previous access control models. ABMAC achieves
the scalability and flexibility necessities for open distributed networks, such as the
Grid. ABMAC functions by replacing the subjects with a set of attributes and the
objects with descriptions in an, so called, Attribute Certificates (ACs). ACs
specify access control information associated with the certificate holder (e.g., age,
citizenship, credit status, group membership, role, security clearance). Thus, the
decision to access a resource is based on the attributes in the requestor’s credentials,
which must be protected in a similar way as any other certificate. Therefore these
are digitally signed sets of attributes created by Attribute Authorities.
Formal Definition of ABMAC
The formal definition of ABMAC is composed of four parts: (1) access
control related entities, attributes of entities - attributes define the identity and
characteristics of the corresponding entity, (2) policy representation - a superset of
independent policy units, and (3) policy evaluation - process of making an access
decision based on the security policy [8]. In short terms, an example of an access
request evaluation would be:
(1)
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Each shortcut in the definition is briefly explained by the following:
 Requestor (Req) - sends requests to and invokes actions on the Grid service;
 Service (Sev) - is invoked via standard protocols and data formats;
 Resource (Res) - always has a specific set of state data expressible as an
XML document and a well-defined lifecycle;
 Action (Act) - Grid service operation invoked by clients;
 Environment (Env) - Grid service invocation, containing additional
information;
 Attributes - represented as Attr;
 ABMAC_adf() - ABMAC decision function that implements a combining
algorithm in combine_f(), which combines the decision results returned by
the access control decision function Pi_adf() of each policy Pi and makes a
final access decision.
ABMAC ADVANTAGES
ABMAC’s preliminary purpose was to (1) reduce, and possibly – completely
remove the inconsistencies, which appeared in the former access control models, (2)
enable flexible and scalable support for multiple policies and (3) integration with
the existing authorization systems. For that reason, various researchers have found a
diversity of approaches to unravel the issues mentioned in Section 2; hence, the
following subsections describe their proposed techniques and models, covering each
security issue separately or in combination.
Solution to science gateways
Since the Grid is inherently a federated environment, every local site wants to
retain its authority on determining who can use its resource. However, the science
gateways, with their non-necessity for user authentication, implicated the question:
Without the user’s identity, how can the grid site know who is using its resources
and whether to grant access or not? [9]. According to this, three possible access
control models were proposed, involving three main entities - a user, a service
provider (SP), i.e. the science gateway, and a RP, i.e. the grid site:
 Complete trust, where the SP enforces both authentication/authorization and
is trusted completely by the RP. The advantage is that a user does not need to
obtain a grid account allocation while still being able to enjoy the
computational power provided by the distributed infrastructure. The
disadvantage is that the grid site cannot control its own access policy (e.g.
differentiated service levels) based on users’ credentials (Figure 3a);
 Medium trust, where the SP still performs authentication, but the final
authorization decision is made by the RP. The advantage is that the RP can
have its own policy to differentiate its service based on users’ attributes and
can have better control on how to allocate its computation resource (Figure
3b);
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 No trust, where both authentication/authorization are executed by the RP.
The advantage is that the RP can independently track individual users using
their resources. The disadvantage is that only users with allocation on the RP
can use the service provided by the SP, which may be too inflexible in
practice and will require secure delegation of user credentials to the SP
(Figure 3c)
Figure 3: Access control models based on trust
Solution to independent domains
The Grid’s open distributed architecture has brought the second security issue
to the picture - the independency of the domains. The domains assumed pre-agreed
trust between the SP and the user, based on the usage of Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI) for authorization. This has proved as inflexible to some extent. Hence,
another access control model was proposed (Figure 4), where trust is being assumed
between SPs and IdPs within a VO. This approach does not rely on PKI user
certificates; instead it combines XACML and SAML technologies, i.e. SSO for user
authentication. Thus, the SP has full control over the overall authentication process,
through the, so called, AAProxy. The Attribute Releaser (AR) as part of the
AAProxy, handles user credentials, after the user has been authenticated, and passes
them to the Authorization Web Service (AuthZ WS). The AuthZ WS handles
XACML bindings and assembles user attribute contents to XACML requests. The
Request Generator (RG) generates a request, which is evaluated by the PDP and
PEP and then sent as request decision to the AAProxy. The LDAP in this case is the
attribute server, where the user attributes are being stored and from which they are
being retrieved [10].
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Figure 4: Authentication/Authorization Model Based on XACML and SAML
Solution to multiple policies
As it was previously portrayed, in grid environments, the VOs are consisted
of several independent domains, where each VO has its own security policy that can
be changed dynamically. Thus, these policies are encapsulated, i.e., they have their
own definitions and decision-making algorithms. Having the XACML authorization
model as in Figure 1 would lead to inflexibility of the Grid to support multiple
policies. Primarily, it would force unified method for policy description. The
scalability would be affected also, since it would not accept integration with the
existing authorization systems. Hence, the ABMAC model through extension of the
existing XACML authorization model, and its association with SAML has solved
this issue. It is also practically implemented in the Globus Toolkit 4 (GT4), the
current de facto solution for Grid security. To be precise, in GT4 Authorization
Framework (Figure 5), a Master PDP is created, with specific policies as its
subclasses. These implement common interface “canAccess()”, where the Master
PDP combines a single access request decision from its set of diverse policies. One
of the policies implemented under the Master PDP is the
SAMLAuthorizationCallout PDP, which enables the needed integration with
third-party authorization systems, like Shibboleth, VOMS and PERMIS [11].
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Figure 5: GT4 Authorization Framework
CONCLUSION
This paper has demonstrated how the three proposed attribute-based access
control models have provided the flexibility and scalability necessary for large-scale
distributed systems such as the Grid, by making access decisions based on the
attributes of the involved entities. The proposed solutions have eliminated the
misconceptions of the former access control models with the issues of science
gateways, independent domains and the multipolicy support. Additionally, by being
already practically implemented in the GT4 authorization framework, the concepts
of cross-domain secure communication, support for multiple policies and
integration of third-party attribute-based authorization systems have been enabled
by now. Therefore, it is only a matter of time when these approaches will become
mature enough to be widespread everywhere.
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